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Finkel: Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment

COMMONSENSE JUSTICE, CULPABILITY, AND
PUNISHMENT
Norman J. Finkel*

I. INTRODUCTION

In Finkel's Commonsense Justice,' his title's defining term is differentiated from black-letter law this way:
There are two types of "law." There is the type we are most familiar
with, namely "black-letter law," the "law on the books." This is the
law that legislators enact, the law that was set down by the Founding
Fathers in the Constitution, the law that evolves through common-law
cases and through appeals decisions. It is the law that law school students study, judges interpret, and jurisprudes analyze. But there is another law-although "law" may be too lofty or lowly a term to describe it: I call it "commonsense justice," and it reflects what ordinary
people think is just and fair. It is embedded in the intuitive notions jurors bring with them to the jury box when judging both a defendant
and the law. It is what ordinary people think the law ought to be.
These commonsense notions are at once legal, moral, and psychological. They provide the citizen on the street and the juror in the jury
box with a theory of why people think, feel, and behave as they do,
and why the law should find some defendants guilty and punishable
and others not. Black-letter law also has its theories of human nature,
culpability, and punishment. But there is mounting and persuasive evidence that the "law on the books" may be at odds with commonsense
justice in many areas.2
The title of this Article links commonsense justice ("CSJ") first to culpability, and then to punishment. In Part H, the connections to culpa-

* Department of Psychology, Georgetown University.
1. NoRMAN J. FINKL, COMIMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURoRs' NOTIONS OFTHE LAw (1995).
2. Id. at 2.
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bility are made manifest through a variety of examples which illustrate
but some of the disparities between black-letter law and CSJ. We see
differences in the way each frames the case, delimits the determinant
factors of culpability, and weighs those factors. Moreover, we see different types of culpability being assessed (i.e., for the act, and for
bringing about their mental condition), and gradationsrather than dichotomies assigned to culpability.
Without such a fme-grained empirical analysis, it could appear that
CSJ's culpability judgments are fusing, confounding, and confusing,
that which ought to be kept clear and distinct, a negative judgment that
has been voiced repeatedly by the jury's harshest critics within the law,
and these voices seem to be reaching crescendo today? Adding to these
negatives and multiplying the problem are the criticisms from those in
the press, politics, and populace, for we hear not only the critical "last
judgment" refrains, but now they are delivered with righteous certainty,
particularly when CSJ's verdicts appear wrongful to "those in the
know." While there is no denying that wrongful verdicts do occur in the
aggregate of cases adjudicated, there is a formidable if not transcendent
problem4 in determining that a "wrongful" verdict occurred in a particular case.
While CSJ's culpability analysis does not march lockstep to blackletter law's tune, the analysis in this Article supports a far more positive
view of CSJ: that the "fusing, confounding, and confusing" picture reveals an underlying sense and sophistication. Furthermore, the analysis
reveals that if the charge of simplism is to be laid anywhere, it is most
aptly placed at Law's doorstep.
In Part IV, the connections between CSJ and punishment are
drawn, and these findings show disparities between the sentences blackletter law and CSJ mete out. These CSJ punishment disparities not only
track their culpability disparities, but they generally grow wider, as
years in prison can reveal differences where the verdicts are the same.
Adding to this, the analysis of the reasons proffered for the sentences
reveal greater sophistication for CSJ than the Law, at times. Moreover,
3. See iL; see also Norman . Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Psychology, and the Law:
Prototypes that are Common, Sensefu4 and Not, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 461, 462 (1997)
[hereinafter Finkel, Prototypes that are Common] (discussing critics of commonsense justice's
("CSJ") methodological inadequacies as leaving a distorted view of CSJ and its prototypes); Norman J. Finkel & Bruce D. Sales, Commonsense Justice: Old Roots, GerminantGround, and New
Shoots, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 227, 230 (1997) [hereinafter Finkel & Sales, Old Roots]
(discussing different works that comment on CSJ).
4. Since God seldom answers a subpoena duces tecum to give us the omniscient answer,
earthly pronouncements, despite righteous tones, fall short.
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we see evidence that the Law's neat and tidy split-between culpability
and punishment-may not be adhered to by CSJ. Thus, at the end, after
digging beneath the "fused, confounded, and confusing" surface, we end
up unearthing time-honored treasures-principles such as proportionality and mitigation-which are consistent with the Law's principles.
In the concluding Part V, the nuances, meanings, and import of
these findings are developed in the light of the ongoing interaction and
relationship between CSJ and the Law. The case for heeding rather than
dismissing CSJ is argued, and the empirical findings provide a strong
factual basis for the argument. But the argument does not rest solely (or
even most importantly) on the view that sociological jurisprudence
makes for better law; rather, the Law's normative foundations are acknowledged, and these, in my opinion, remain too solid and essential to
be overturned solely by the sheer volume of woolly empirics; empirics
which may themselves be shorn by the next set of experiments. Rather,
the view put forth here is more earthy and enriching, resting on a simple
root premise: that laws are made by human beings, about the thoughts,
feelings, and actions of other human beings. This root premise sends off
far-reaching shots, for if this premise is so, then the Law must hold
some psychological theory or theories about actors (be they defendants,
witnesses, attorneys, judges, or justices) and their acts. Put another way,
the Law must have its own commonsense notions,5 its own "commonsense psychology, ' 6 and its behavioral assumptions about laws, legal
systems, and legal processes.7 The argument, then, is not about replacing black-letter law with CSJ, but about CSJ informing Law, perfecting
Law, and solidifying Law's institutional legitimacy.9
5. See OLIVER WENDELL HoLEms, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., Dover Publications 1991) (1881). Holmes began his seminal work by finding the life of the law not in
logic, but in experience:
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which men should be governed.
Id.
6. See Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law and Psycholegal Research, 5 U. CHI. L. ScH.ROUNDTABLE 107, 110 (1998).
7. See Bruce D. Sales, The Legal Regulation of Psychology: Scientific and Professional
Interactions, in 2 THE MASTER LEcrURE SERiEs: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 9, 10-13 (C. James
Scheirer & Barbara L. Hammonds eds., 1983).
8. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CreME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOET AND THE
LAW ON TRIAL 154 (1988). Fletcher writes about juries using their power "not to defeat the law,
but to perfect the law, to realize the law's inherent values." Id.
9. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Institutional Legitimacy, ProceduralJustice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions:A Question of Causality, 25 L. & Soc'Y REv. 631, 633-34
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However, before proceeding down this Article's title track, we
must address and answer, in Part II, a preliminary question which may
derail this associative train long before its substantive destination is
reached. The preliminary question is this: If black-letter law is the
law-the one and only law-then why bother with CSJ at all?
We can put the question in the form of three objections to CSJ,
each raised by a different black-letter law advocate. The first advocate,
in a peremptory swipe, clears the field of CSJ findings, arguing that they
have no relevance whatsoever for the law.' ° The second advocate, less
extreme, willingly stipulates that CSJ findings do reveal disparities, yet
argues that those empirics are moot in the Law's largely normative
world." And the third advocate, despite recognizing that at times the
Law's world turns decidedly empirical (as in Eighth Amendment "cruel
and unusual" punishment cases), nonetheless regards social science
findings as misplaced foundlings, mistakenly dumped on the Supreme
Court's doorstep in amici briefs.'2 To illustrate the latter, Justice Scalia
disparagingly labeled such findings as "socioscientific" and
"ethicoscientific," which find no home, he argued, among the sanctioned3 objective indicia of jury decisions or legislative enactments
data.1
The battle must be fought, then, on the field of the Eighth Amendment;
and in that struggle socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific evidence is not an available weapon. The punishment is either
"cruel and unusual" (i.e., society has set its face against it) or it is not.
The audience for these arguments, in other words, is not this Court but
the citizenry
of the United States. It is they, not we, who must be per4
suaded.'
If CSJ findings are dismissed as irrelevant across the entire adjudicative
front, as the first advocate would have it, or dismissed as irrelevant in
cases of normative decision-making, as the second advocate would have
it, or dismissed as immaterial when the Court is committed to an em-

(1991); James L. Gibson, Understandingsof Justice:InstitutionalLegitimacy, ProceduralJustice,

and Political Tolerance, 23 L. & Soc'Y REV. 469, 470-72 (1989); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth
Rasinski, ProceduralJustice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of UnpopularU.S. Supreme CourtDecisions:A Reply to Gibson, 25 L. & Soc'Y REV. 621,621-23 (1991).
10. See infranotes 32-52 and accompanying text.
11. See infranotes 53-62 and accompanying text.
12. See infranotes 63-79 and accompanying text.
13. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989).

14. Id.
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pirical assessment of community sentiment, as the third advocate maintains, then our preliminary question takes on an added urgency.
If these above advocates have their way, Law's adjudicative train
will pull out of the station leaving CSJ behind. In Part II, three reasons
are offered for why this course is error-bound, and why its destination
cannot be reached. The first reason, which is systemic, begins with the
recognition that juries (and hence CSJ) remain a legal fixture; for the
jury system is bred into the legal bone, so to speak. Said another way,
CSJ is already on the train. To either ignore these sanctioned passengers
or pretend that their views do not count-when we cede to them a "final
say" in culpability and life or death punishment questions-denies reality and ups the odds of derailment (e.g., jurors nullifying, failing to
comprehend, or reconstruing the law in ways that the Law did not intend). The second reason, which is consequential, involves the Law's
own credibility and authority, its institutional legitimacy, and its compelling interest in seeing that its decisions are obeyed rather than defied.
And the third reason, which is limited but constitutionally mandated,
involves the Law's expressed mission in certain Eighth Amendment
cases, of an accurate and objective reading of the community's views.
Together, these reasons involve not only CSJ's potential to negatively
impact the law, but its potential for positively enhancing the law.
I.

WHY HEED COMMONSENSE JUSTICE?

As long as the Law's adjudicative process still involves "the
lengthy constitutional heritage of the jury,"'6 CSJ will always be aboard
the train-not as a stowaway, not as a standby, but with a sanctioned
seat. Despite this heritage, there are some reformers who have urged the
removal of these ordinary citizens in favor of more elitist alternatives."
This call to remove the people has been particularly strong regarding
civil trials." Reformist arguments, however, and the evidence cited to
bolster them, remain suspect, being contravened by sounder data, from
sounder methods, along with sounder and more defensible arguments."

15. See infra notes 16-79 and accompanying text.
16. Daniel W. Shuman & Anthony Champagne, Removing the Peoplefrom the Legal Process: The Rhetoric and Research on Judicial Selection and Juries, 3 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L.

242,242 (1997).
17. See id.
18. See id,at 250, 256.
19. See id. at 242, 249-56; see also NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTSNG THE MYTHS ABouT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS x (1995) ("[Medical [malpractice] negligence juries ... perform
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Although calls to eliminate CSJ from the criminal law side have
been fewer, those calls periodically do come, particularly when verdicts

in certain high profile cases appear to be indefensible, wrongheaded,
and wrong-at least to the talking heads, pundits, and armchair jurors
who are watching Court TV and making those judgments. But the place
of the jury on the criminal law side is firmer, with buttressing evidence

coming from death penalty adjudication, where the law wants jurorsthe "conscience of the community" ---to have the final say, albeit along
guided discretionary lines.
Putting civil and criminal law together, the composite forecast
yields a safe bet: Given the jury's historical, constitutional, and current
community sentiment support, and given the absence of sound, substantive data for the greater effectiveness of alternatives, the jury will be

traveling with the law for a long time to come."' Thus, ruling CSJ out of
bounds simply will not work, as CSJ refuses, by its de jure or de facto
presence, to stay out of bounds.2
If this is the case, then a psychological stop and search of jurors is
worth doing to further understand what jurors bring With them to trial,
and to the assessment of tasks that are put to them. This would involve
an analysis of citizens' prototypes of crimes and criminals, their notions
of fairness, justice, culpability, and reasonable doubt, and their proportional sense of justice, for all of these may vary slightly-to-significantly
from black-letter law's positions.' Along with these, jurors may also be
their functions reasonably well."); Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of CorporateDefendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 327-28 (1998) (arguing that the reputation juries have for being biased against corporate defendants is more of an illusion than a reality);
Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Peformance as a Risk
Manager,40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 902 (1998) (assuming that some jury decisions serve as "social
risk management"); Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures
of a Social Science Casefor Change, 48 DEPAuL L. REv. 867, 867 (1999) (refuting the argument
that judges do a better job than juries in setting punitive damage levels because they are wrong, illsupported, and not affected by "jury hindsight bias"); Richard Lempert, Why Do Juries Get a Bum
Rap? Reflections on the Work of Valerie Hans, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 454-55 (1998)
(supporting the conclusion that juries are capable of making unbiased decisions concerning corporate defendants and offering reasons why people persist in believing that jury attitudes toward corporate defendants have a strong effect on jury decisions).
20. See Norman . Finkel, Culpability and Commonsense Justice: Lessons Learned Betwixt
Murderand Madness, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 11, 13 (1996).
21. See Shuman & Champagne, supra note 16, at 250-51, 253-56 (opining that the constitutional history and empirical examination of the jury system evidences the adequacy and propriety
of its continued use).
22. See Finkel, supra note 20, at 57, 59, 62 (arguing that the scope of CSJ is wider than that
of the black-letter law).
23. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JoHN M. DARLEY, JUSTIcE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY ViEws AND THE CRIMNAL LAw 201-02, 204 (1995); Finkel, Prototypes that are
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influenced by heuristics,' ignorance and prejudice, 5 myths,2 accessibility biases,' and pretrial publicity.s Such factors-some normal, some

not, some wholesome, some not-can never be screened out entirely
during voir dire, such that the sitting jurors are far from the mythical

blank slates for which some might wish. 9 This being the case, it would
not be surprising if extralegal factors intruded into culpability and pun-

Common, supra note 3, at 463, 475; Norman J. Finkel & Jennifer L. Groscup, Crime Prototypes,
Objective versus Subjective Culpability, and a Commonsense Balance, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
209, 211 (1997) [hereinafter Finkel & Groscup, Crime Prototypes];Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in
the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
857, 868, 870 (1991); Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors
Use the Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 509 (1993) [hereinafter Smith, Helping JurorsUse the
Law]; Vicki L. Smith & C. A. Studebaker, What Do You Expect: The Influence of People'sPrior
Knowledge of Crime Categories on Fact-Finding, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 517, 518 (1996)
[hereinafter Smith & Studebaker, What Do You Expect?]; Loretta J. Stalans, Citizens' Crime
Stereotypes, Biased Recall, and Punishment Preferencesin Abstract Cases: The EducativeRole of
InterpersonalSources, 17 LAW & HUm. BEHAV. 451, 452, 453-54 (1993); Loretta J. Stalans &
Shari Seidman Diamond, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 199, 200-01 (1990).
24. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand
Biases, 185 Sa. 1124,1124 (1974).
25. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). There, Justice Marshall stated that the public's support for the death penalty was based on lack of knowledge, and had they been fully informed, they would find the punishment "shocking, unjust, and
unacceptable" and would conclude that it "is immoral and therefore unconstitutional." Id at 361,
363. But see James Alan Fox et al., Death Penalty Opinion in the Post-FurmanYears, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 499, 503 (1990-1991) (finding a general increase in support for the death
penalty).
26. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary
Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1990) (noting that the insanity
defense is a prisoner of myths about the connection between mental illness, crime, and punishment); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense
Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 706-08 (1989-90) (discussing myths that plague
adequate invocation of the insanity defense at trial).
27. See generally Valerie P. Hans, Law and the Media: An Overview and Introduction, 14
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 399 (1990) (discussing studies on the access citizens have to understanding
the criminal justice system and its effects on their role as jurors). Since print and television do not
portray the full range of cases, nor even average cases, but rather expose readers and viewers to
extremist cases, these are what jurors are likely to find most accessible to recall. See id at 400,
402.
28. See generally Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Peurod, PretrialPublicity: The Media, the Law, and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 428 (1997) (discussing the effects
publicity and media coverage have on potential jurors). In addition to the pretrial publicity effects
on jurors, there are also the inflated beliefs of jurors that they can set these biases aside, and the
inflated beliefs of attorneys and judges in their competency to detect and weed out such biased
jurors, where empirical evidence shows that the batting average of the latter legal players is not
nearly as high as those groups claim. See id. at 441.
29. See id at 440-42; Smith, Helping JurorsUse the Law, supra note 23, at 509.
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ishment decisions," and not surprising if jurors reconstrued jury instructions and their key terms so as to nullify on some occasions.31
A.

Jury Nullification, Comprehension, and
Reconstrualof Instructions

Archival findings suggest that jury nullification has been, and continues to be, part of our jurisprudence,32 although other findings from

empirical studies33 and experiments' 4 suggest that nullifications may not
be nearly as frequent as many critics of juries suggest. But in the current
climate, where allegations of jury nullification seem to be on the rise,

and popular press and scholarly commentary on the topic has intensified, the question has taken on added heat and urgency. And why not?
If nullifications are happening, and more are on the upswing, then
Law's worst nightmare-anarchy-may be at the gates.36

Whether juries should have the right to nullify has been longdebated in scholarly literature, with courts consistently ruling that jurors
do not have such a right.3 In realpolitik, however, all agree that juries
have the power to nullify, and therein lies the threat.38 If juries use that
power and become wildcat operations, 9 or all-too-readily toss aside

30. See Hans, supra note 27, at 401.
31. See Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 28, at 442-43.
32. See, e.g., THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PER.
SPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, at 368 (1985); Irwin A. Horowitz &
Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views of Jury Power: The Nullification Debate, 1787-1988, 15
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 165, 165-66 (1991).
33. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 310-12 (Phoenix
ed., University of Chicago Press 1971); Horowitz & WiUging, supranote 32, at 172-74.
34. See Finkel, Prototypesthat are Common, supra note 3, at 467, 469; Irwin A. Horowitz,
The Effect of JuryNullification Instruction on Verdicts and Jury Functioningin CriminalTrials, 9
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 28 (1985) [hereinafter Horowitz, Effect of Jury Nullification]; Irwin A.
Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of JudicialInstructions,Arguments, and Challenges on
Jury Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439,450-52 (1988) [hereinafter Horowitz, Judicial Instructions].
35. See, e.g., Horowitz, Effect of Jury Nullification, supra note 34, at 27; Horowitz &
Willging, supranote 32, at 171-72.
36. See Horowitz, Effect of JuryNullification, supra note 34, at 27.
37. See id. A few states, however, do give jurors a weak nullification instruction, though
none urge or push in that direction. See iL at 29 (describing nullification instructions used in
Maryland and Kansas).
38. See generally Christo Lassiter, The O.J. Simpson Verdict: A Lesson in Black and White,
1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 69 (1996) (using the O.J. Simpson verdict to explain the potential effect of
press sensationalism, one aspect of American realpolitik, political and social reality, on jurors, and
to relate that effect to the threat that jury nullification has on the American system of justice).
39. See KALvEN & ZEISEL, supra note 33, at 286, 295-97. In this classic work, the authors
look at this "wildcat" possibility and suggest that, in fact, the jury's revolt with the law is quite
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their sworn oath to follow the law at a lawless whim, 4° then black-letter
law's worst nightmare is made manifest.41 Yet, what is also made manifest is my first point-that black-letter law can ill-afford to ignore CSJ.

My second point begins with the very term, jury nullification,
which masks significant differences among types, blurring important
type distinctions that ought to be kept clear.42 For example, some juries
may nullify because they believe that the law is a bad law, substantively

flawed or out of sync with today's values; other juries may nullify because the procedures at trial seem blatantly unfair, amounting to a railroading or kangaroo court; while still other juries may nullify on both

substantive and procedural grounds.4' If juries bring in a not guilty verdict, despite the fact that the prosecution has proved all elements of the

charge beyond a reasonable doubt, then we can categorize these various
types as "total nullifications," the traditional way of portraying nullification.'M But there is another variant, "partial nullification," where the

jury brings in a lesser verdict (i.e., where guilt is mitigated but not
eliminated) yet where this lesser verdict does not fit the facts as proved
by the prosecution.45 Perhaps juries see that the legal verdict does not
match the defendant's act, intent, and culpability, or see that the pun-

ishment does not fit the crime. Without parsing nullification into its
types and variants, we cannot understand why jurors are nullifying (if

modest. See id.
40. Other researchers do not find this easy discarding of the law in favor of nullification. See
FINKEL, supra note 1, at 331; Finkel, Prototypesthat are Common, supra note 3, at 466-67; Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice and Jury Instructions:Instructive and Reciprocating Connections, PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 2000); Horowitz & Willging, supra note 32, at
174; Horowitz, JudicialInstructions,supra note 34, at 450.
41. See Keith E. Niedermeier et al., Informing Jurorsof Their Nullification Power: A Route
to a Just Verdict or JudicialChaos?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 331, 348 (1999). In an experiment
that tried to create the law's worst nightmare, the researchers found, in four studies that examined
juror biases predicated on defendant status, remorse, gender, national origin, penalty severity, and
extenuating circumstances, that undisciplined and biased juror judgments were not amplified by
nullification instructions, providing little evidence that this invited chaos. See id.
42. See FINKEL, supra note 1, at 32-33; Finkel, Prototypes that are Common, supra note 3,
at 463.
43. For alleged historical examples of each, see FINKEL, supra note 1, at 23-40; see also
GREEN, supra note 32, at 35-64 (describing jury nullification in 14th century England); VALEiE
P. HANs & NEIL ViDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 149-63 (1986) (discussing historical examples of
jury nullification).
44. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.
CtuM. L. & CRIINOLOGY 1194, 1256 (1997) (discussing total nullification in the context of rape
where the parties knew each other and no aggregating factors were present).
45. See Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV.
205, 232 (1999) (comparing compromise verdicts to partial jury nullification).
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they are). Thus, the Law remains like a statue, blind to CSJ's instructive
message.
My third point moves from jury nullification to the jury's comprehension and reconstrual of instructions. This move requires a few steps.
First, when most speak about jury nullification, they mean that the jurors, all six or twelve of them, are willfully disregarding the facts, the
law, and their oath.' But what is the likelihood of that? From social
psychological findings regarding conformity and compliance, as opposed to rebelling and pulling the entire group to rebel, that literature
predicts that rebelling or defying one's duty would be rare rather than
extensive.47 Second, for the claim of nullification to be sustained, we
face that transcendent problem again, of assuming that we know the
right and true verdict in order to conclude that the jury's verdict is
wrongful. Yet, the assumption rests on the most airy notions-our
hunches, speculations, or shared delusions. We can do a bit better in
mock jury simulations, for here we can set up the case in such a way
that a guilty verdict ought to result; yet even here there are other possibilities to consider.
For one, did the jury get the verdict option they wanted? The nullification claim presupposes that the jury had the correct choice, but
chose willfully and wrongly to ignore it. That may not be so. Second,
reasonable doubt is a legitimate and sanctioned area for jurors to exercise their discretion,' and its definitions not only vary but can be construed differently, such that a leniency bias49 or a conviction bias" may
show. And finally, the jury instructions per se may be poorly written, or
poorly comprehended, such that the key terms can be construed or reconstrued in ways the law did not intend.5 While many critics of jurors
46. See Finkel, supra note 20, at 11-12.
47. See, e.g., STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORrrY 4-6 (1974); FATHALI M.
MOGHADDAM, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: EXPLORING UNIVERSALS ACROSS CuLTUREs

126-27, 239-42

(1998) (discussing a cross-cultural analysis that shows, despite the rhetoric and prototypical portrayal of America's "'rugged individualism,"' we are, as a people, no more non-conformist than
many other societies); Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of
One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1 (1956).
48. See, e.g., Irwin A. Horowitz, Reasonable Doubt Instructions:Commonsense Justice and
Standardof Proof,3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 285,285-86 (1997).
49. See Fimkel & Sales, Old Roots, supra note 3, at 231.

50. See id,
51. See, e.g., AMIRAM ELWORK Er AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE
130-40 (1982); Amiram Elwork et al., JuridicDecisions:In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of
It?, 1 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 163, 178 (1977); Peter W. English & Bruce D. Sales, A Ceiling or
Consistency Effectfor the Comprehension of Jury Instructions,3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 381,
383 (1997); Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury
Instruction Process,3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589, 589 (1997).
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have highlighted nullification as the problem,52 the comprehension and
reconstrual of the instructions problem is likely to be the bigger bugbear. Yet, for the Law to read the instructive message, it must come to
understand the reasons that lie within the message, and not merely condemn those that send the message.
B. InstitutionalLegitimacy
4

53
Sophocles' Antigone and Shakespeare's Measure for Measure,separated by some two thousand years, both take up the theme of what
is likely to happen to the institutional legitimacy of Law, and to the very
government that backs it, when the law is perceived to be at odds with a
deeper sense of justice. This is far from just a long running literary
theme. During this past decade, Supreme Court Justices have been divided over decisions that have cited to the community sentiment position as a reason or justification for the Court's own decision.
On one side, Justice Scalia has argued for judicial decision-making
that is independent of community sentiment and societal harmony concerns. 5 Other justices have taken the other side, believing that those
factors ought to be considered for the law to be adhered to, as well as to
maintain the Court's institutional legitimacy.56 But this characterization
is simplistic, for ironically it has been Justice Scalia who has frequently
acknowledged the limitations of Supreme Court Justices, who, unlike
members of the first and second branches of government, are unelected,
and Justice Scalia has delivered his chastisements when Justices act as
Platonic Guardians, as a "committee of philosopher-kings," not appre-

52. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Jury Reform at the End of the Century: Real Agreement, Real
Changes, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 213, 220 (1999) (noting that individual prosecutors and
judges assert that there is a jury nullification problem).
53. Sophocles, Antigone, in II THE COMPLETE GREEK TRAGEDIES 159 (David Grene &
Richmond Lattimore eds., 1959). Antigone sought to bury her slain brother, but the King issued a
decree forbidding the burial. The law made it a crime, but Antigone deliberately broke the law,
and her appeal was to "the gods' unwritten and unfailing laws," a higher law. See id. at 174.
54. WvILuAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE (Brian Gibbons ed., 1991) (1623). In
this play, Vienna has gone to seed under the permissive rules of Duke Vincentio, with debauchery
and corruption rampant. The Duke deliberately departs, and appoints Angelo as his replacement,
who wields the law in strict ways, where measure for measure-the unyielding letter of the lawleads not to justice. See id.

55. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 702 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned Parent-

hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983-84 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 70 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., Ornelas,517 U.S. at 699; Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,475 (1984).
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ciating that "'those institutions which the Constitution is supposed to
limit' include the Court itself."57
An activist Court, which makes, rather than interprets, law, runs
the risk of losing institutional legitimacy, for it is in danger of exceeding its constitutional authority." Like a tower erected that leans out too
far from its foundational base, it may topple. But Justice Blackmun,
writing in Georgiav. McCollum, 59 stated that "[p]ublic confidence in the
integrity of the criminal justice system is essential for preserving community peace in trials involving race-related crimes,""W and that allowing
exclusion of groups from the jury "'could only undermine ... confidence in it."''6 In Justice Blackmun's view, one foundational base for
Law rests upon community sentiment, and to erect law unmindful of
that base may yield a Tower of Babel, which may topple out of disrespect. In quite different ways, and from different points of view, Justices Scalia and Blackmun are clearly concerned with the institutional
legitimacy of the Court.62
C. When the Court is Committed to Doinga
Social Science Analysis
Whereas the nullification, comprehension, and reconstrual of instruction problems may be denied or minimized as but minor flies in the
Law's ointment, and whereas the institutional legitimacy problem may
be dismissed as no problem at all, it is harder to deny or dismiss CSJ
when it is the central subject of the Court's scrutiny, as in Eighth
Amendment cases. When the Supreme Court in Weems v. United
States held the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual" clause must
evolve because it "may acquire [wider] meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice,"' the path was set toward some
assessment of the community sentiment. In Trop v. Dulles,5 the Court

57. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (quoting the dissent).
58. See Maureen Straub Kordesh, "I Will Build My House With Sticks": The Splintering of
PropertyInterests Under the Fifth Amendment May be Hazardous to Private Property,20 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 397,460 (1996).
59. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
60. iL at 49.
61. IL at 49-50 (quoting State v. Alvarado, 534 A.2d 440,442 (1987).
62. For an insider's account of Justice Scalia and Justice Blackmun's views regarding institutional legitimacy of the court see EDWARD LAzARus, CLOsED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND
FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT (1998).
63. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
64. a at 378.
65. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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again made it clear that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," and thereby committed the Justices to the role of social

scientists, for it is they who must gauge where community sentiment
now lies.

But committing Supreme Court Justices to the role of social scientists and committing the Court to a social science task is one thing;
specifying how to do it, and how to do it well, is quite another. On the
latter points, problematic questions remain. First, there are a number of
methodology questions that a social scientist would ask: How does the

Court gather such data? What measures (i.e., objective indicia)6 do they
anoint as yardsticks and which do they shun? Is there proper and thoroughgoing consideration given to the limitations of the methods selected?" Are the chosen measures comprehensive and valid, broad
enough, deep enough, and fine-tuned enough to gauge the very subject
matter under question? Then when the task is done, and all is said and
done, there remains another question: Can the Court's social science
analysis survive social science scrutiny?
When social scientists examine the Supreme Court's performance
in recidivist cases, 69 accessory felony-murder death penalty cases,70 and
juvenile death penalty cases,"1 we see bitter and close divisions. How-

ever, divisions alone need not be problematic, particularly if the data are
equivocal. Yet that is not what we find.72 Rather, there are repeated and
66. id.at 101.

67. Two objective indicia that appear over and over again are legislative enactment data and
jury decision data. See Norman J.Finkel, Prestidigitation,StatisticalMagic, and Supreme Court
Numerology in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. Pun. PoL'Y & L. 612, 614, 620 (1995)
[hereinafter Finkel, Prestidigitation].
68. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder,Objective Indicia, and Community
Sentiment, 32 AmuZ. L. REv. 819, 849 (1990) [hereinafter Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder];Finkel,
Prestidigitation,supra note 67, at 622-23; Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 58-59 (1980).
69. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of a state
recidivist statute imposing a life sentence upon repeat felony offenders); Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263 (1980) (holding a state's recidivist statute imposing a life sentence on repeat felony offenders unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
70. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (upholding as constitutional under the
Eighth Amendment the accessorial liability rule, which imposes capital punishment on an accessory to felony-murder); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding the imposition of the
death penalty on accessories to felony-murder to be inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment).
71. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding as constitutional trying
minors who commit felonies as adults and sentencing them to death); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1988) (holding that the execution of a minor who was tried as an adult was cruel and
unusual punishment).
72. See Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder,supra note 68, at 888; Finkel, Prestidigitation,su-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 28:669

heated disagreements involving which gauges ought to count, with some
gauges being ruled out of bounds arbitrarily, capriciously, and indefensibly, while others are included on political grounds, rather than grounds
of validity. 7 Furthermore, the majority and dissent readings from those
limited gauges reveal unsupportable assumptions, blatant errors, impermissible inferences, and flawed conclusions.74 Moreover, when the
social scientist takes on the same task, but uses more fine-grained and
controlled measures, the readings of CSJ are significantly disparate.7376
Finally, in the wake of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,77 and in light of the Court's concern
about junk science,78 the Supreme Court's social science analysis in
these death penalty cases takes on the appearance of a food fight, where
Justices hammer one another in footnotes hurling accusations of presti-

digitation, statistical magic, and numerology.79 In the end, the Supreme
Court's social science analysis does not withstand social science scrutiny.
Given that Eighth Amendment death penalty cases involve the
death decision, and where the Court delivers a let stand or remand deci-

sion, the stakes alone would push for stricter scrutiny over the process
of gauging CSJ. And lastly, if there is any area where social scientists

could legitimately assist in this social science task, it is here.

pra note 67, at 639-40.
73. See Finkel, Prestidigitation,supra note 67, at 613; Norman J. Finkel & Stefanie F.
Smith, Principals and Accessories in Capital Felony-Murder: The ProportionalityPrinciple
Reigns Supreme, 27 L. & Soc'Y REv. 129, 130-32 (1993) [hereinafter Finkel & Smith, Principals
and Accessories].
74. See generally Finkel, Prestidigitation,supra note 67, at 615-18 (discussing the conflicting majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court Justices and questioning the possible
subjective and personal consciences of the Justices).
75. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel, Socioscientific Evidence and Supreme Court Numerology:
When Justices Attempt Social Science, 11 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 67, 76 (1993); Norman J. Finkel &
Kevin B. Duff, Felony-Murder and Community Sentiment: Testing the Supreme Court's Assertions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 405, 420-21, 427 (1991) [hereinafter Finkel & Duff, Testing the
Supreme Court'sAssertions];Finkel & Smith, Principalsand Accessories, supra note 73, at 135,
143-44; Norman L Finkel et al., Killing Kids: The Juvenile Death Penalty and Community Sentiment, 12 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 5, 8, 19 (1994) [hereinafter Finkel et al., Juvenile Death Penalty];
Norman J. Fnkel et al., Recidivism, Proportionalism,and Individualized Punishment, 39 AM.
BEHAV. Sci. 474,481-82 (1996) [hereinafter Finkel et al., Recidivism, Proportionalsm].
76. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (determining the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony
as that which is generally accepted among the scientific community as relevant and reliable).
77. 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (expanding Daubert'srelevant and reliable standard to all expert
testimony).
78. See Finkel, Prestidigitation,supranote 67, at 638-39.
79. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 870 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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COMMONSENSE JUSTICE AND CULPABILITY

A.

Sailing a Subjective Course, With an
Objective Ballast

In Professor Fletcher's work,' he states that criminal law has long
been divided on the question of whether objectivity (the objective act,
actus reus) or subjectivity (the subjective intent, mens rea) should be its
dominant basis for judging culpability, though he notes that this conflict
is typically "camouflaged by ... legal maxims that create an image of
unity in criminal theory.""1 One legal maxim that he refers to "is that
proof of both actus reus and mens rea is required."82 But does this conjoining euphemism unite the divide and make the division moot, or does
it mask a weighty substantive division beneath the pap of simplicity,
leaving the divide open? Texts on criminal law suggest that the division
has not healed, much less receded into history, for these texts typically
feature real or hypothetical examples of "impossible act" cases,83 where,
for example, a defendant's intent to kill is clear, but where "no criminal
act" occurs and no harm results. " If the conjoining euphemism is the
arbiter, then these cases should necessarily lead to a not guilty verdict

under black-letter law.
But such a not guilty result is not the case for CSJ. In one experiment,8 participants received five impossible act cases86 and had to render a verdict on the charge of attempted murder, and had to give their
80. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978).
81. Id. at 119.
82. I.
83. d.; see, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRInINAL LAW 368-376 (2d ed.
1995) (discussing the defense of impossibility and mentioning several examples).
84. For one example, take a man who attempts to kill his wife, drives her to a secluded spot,
puts a gun to her head, and fires, only then realizing that he forgot the bullets. Does firing an unloaded pistol constitute "attempted murder"? Cf id. at 368-69 (discussing other impossible act
cases involving attempted murder).
85. See Norman J. Fmkel et al., Lay Perspectives on Legal Conundrums: Impossible and
Mistaken Act Cases, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 593, 597-601 (1995).
86. See id. at 597-98. The cases were called "Tree stump," "Dead body," "No bullets,"
"Sugar cubes," and "Effigy." See &l. In Tree stump, a man takes aim and fires a rifle at what he
thinks is a person, only to find out that he perceived wrongly, hitting but a tree stump. See id. at
597. In Dead body, a person tries to kill a neighbor by firing shots through a window at the neighbor while the latter apparently slept in bed, only we learn that the neighbor had died earlier in his
sleep. See id. at 598. In No bullets, a husband attempts to kill his wife by shooting her but forgets
to put bullets into the gun. See it. at 598. In Sugar cubes, a wife tries to kill her husband by dropping arsenic-laced sugar cubes in his morning tea, only she mistakenly drops ordinary sugar cubes
in. See id. at 598. And in Effigy, someone tries to kill another by sticking pins in an effigy doll.
See id. at 597-98.
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reasons for their decision." In four of the five cases, a guilty verdict is
the more frequent one, and in three of those four cases, it is rendered
almost all the time." Moreover, in those three cases (Dead body, No
bullets, and Sugar cubes), the reasons participants' offered overwhelmingly stressed subjectivity-the clear intent to kill.89 They saw these
cases as involving fortuity (Dead body) or defendant stupidity (No bullets and Sugar cubes), and their position was that these defendants
should not profit from fortuity or their mistakes when their intent
(premeditation) was to take a life.9°
If we stop at just this result, we see a clear and wide disparity between black-letter law's and CSJ's culpability analysis. 9' Yet CSJ's almost exclusive reliance on subjectivity-seeming to begin and end its
analysis with intent alone--might bolster those critics who claim that
jurors are prone to plunge into subjectivity, ignoring objectivity entirely.
However, this criticism can be rebutted by the results from the other two
impossible act cases (Tree stump, Effigy), and by looking at mistaken
act cases. 9'
First, in Tree stump, where the verdicts roughly divide, although
this defendant also makes a mistake (a mistake in perception), participants cite the objective factor that no actual danger exists to any person.' Had that defendant realized his mistake before his attempt, no
person was in immediate danger. 95 To the contrary, had the defendants
in No bullets and Sugar cubes realized their mistakes before their attempts, and then loaded the pistol or dropped the arsenic-laced sugar
cubes, a death would surely have resulted; 96 and had fortuity not intervened in Dead body, such that the sleeping victim was still alive, a

87. See id. at 598. In the five cases, the guilty verdicts percentages for Effigy, Tree stump,
Dead body, No bullets, and Sugar cubes were 17%, 53%, 91%, 100%, and 100%, respectively,

which were far removed from the 0% predicted by black-letter law's conjoining euphemism. See
id. at 599-600.
88. See id. at 599.
89. See id.
90. See i at 660.
91. See Finkel, supra note 20, at 15-16; see also Finkel & Sales, Old Roots, supra note 3, at
227 (comparing and contrasting black-letter law with CSJ).

92. See Norman J. Fmkel & Jennifer L. Groscup, When Mistakes Happen: Commonsense
Rules of Culpability, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 65, 119-22 (1997) [hereinafter Finkel &
Groscup, When Mistakes Happen]; see also Finkel, supra note 20, at 60 (stating that CSJ "seems
to take a more subjective perspective").

93.
94.
95.
96.

See Finkel et al., supra note 85, at 599.
See i. at 600.
See iU
See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol28/iss3/4

16

Finkel: Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment

20001

COMMONSENSE JUSTICE

death would have resulted as well.' Objectivity also plays the determinative role in Effigy, for while there is again a mistake being mide by
the defendant, according to our participants, they see this as a mistake in
causal reasoning, where there is no sufficient cause: objectively, they do
not see sticking pins in a doll as a credible, realistic attempted murder"f
We then went on to mistake cases proper." We began with a selfdefense case, where the objective facts and the defendant's fears from
those facts led him to believe that he was facing a loaded gun and immediate death, whereupon he fires his gun and kills the assailant, and
then claims self-defense."° For this beginning case, 63% of the participants find him not guilty by reason of self-defense.0 But then we created four variations of this case, all involving a mistake (be it in perception, reasoning, or judgment), where the mistakes go from reasonable to
dubious to unreasonable to delusional."° Our reasoning was this: If
subjectivity is the be all and end all of ordinary citizens' culpability
analyses, then the only thing that should matter is what the defendant
believed at the moment he acted, regardless of its grounding (or lack of)
in objective reality.' But this is not what we found. As the
"reasonableness" of the mistake begins to wane, guilty verdicts dramatically rise, reaching 96% and 100% in unreasonable and delusional
variations. 4
Our findings are supported by a policy capturing experiment by
Erich Greene and John Darley,0 5 who tested seventeen scenarios which
featured a planned murder that succeeded, a number of attempted murders that failed for a variety of reasons (e.g., fortuity, incompetence,
outside interference), and versions where deaths resulted by accident or
other factors.'" This complex and sophisticated design allowed the researchers to parse and evaluate necessary and sufficient causes, CSJ's
use of those causes in comparison to the Model Penal Code's position,
and how CSJ and the law evaluate causality when there was an apparent

97.
98.
99.
100.

See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 601.
id.
id. at 603.

101. See id.
at 605.
102. See id.
at 603-04.
103. See id.
at 604.

104. See id. at 605.
105. See Erich J. Greene & John M. Darley, Effects of Necessary, Sufficient, and Indirect
Causationon Judgments of CriminalLiability, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 429,432-48 (1998).

106. See id. at 433, 449-51.
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break in the chain.'re They found, as we did, that "actions that are normally sufficient to bring about the criminal result deserve higher punishments than mere attempts," ' 8 and they conclude that the Model Penal
Code's position, and a code conforming to the community's phenomenological standards, would differ'0 9 Moreover, citizens view liability "in
a strikingly continuous manner," where the notion of "contributions" (in
their theory of causation), captures something more than "necessity"
does in a legal analysis. " Although Greene and Darley note that this lay
theory of causation "is not easy to
specify," they conclude that "it has
'
components of sturdy rationality." '
When taken together, the more consistent interpretation of these
findings is that CSJ starts with subjectivity, but it does not lose its way
or plunge headlong into dark subjective waters, for it balances subjectivity with objectivity in sensible ways. Moreover, CSJ makes more
distinctions and sees more shading than legal dichotomies provide. And
finally, the CSJ theories of causation and culpability appear rational,
and highly nuanced.
B. A CulpabilityStory of Complexities and
Interactions...
In another experiment, we began by opening the mistake net wide,
picking twelve different mistake cases, with four variants per case." 2 In
our low harm (de minimus) cases, the intent of the defendant ("D") was
the participants' starting and main point for their eventual culpability
107. See id. at 445-48.
108. Id. at 445.

109. See id. at446.
Thus, in a code that conformed to community standards, actions that were either necessary or sufficient to bring about a prohibited harm would be criminalized as that harm,
rather than as an attempt. This would differ from the stance of the current Model Penal
Code, which criminalizes a sufficient case as only attempt; the factual cause standard
would be importantly altered.

L
110. See id.
111. Id. at447.
112. See Finkel & Groscup, When Mistakes Happen, supra note 92, at 68.
We sample mistake cases that remain in the ordinary interpersonal or social arena and
those that end up in the legal arena. We sample cases that involve serious harms, midlevel harms, and those involving small or even trivial harms (i.e., de minimus cases).
We sample cases where the actor's intent ranges from the most blameworthy premeditation, to reckless disregard, to negligence, to even lower.... We test different type[s]
of mistakes (i.e., mistake of fact and mistake of law), and within the mistake of fact
realm, types of mistakes, and how reasonable the mistake was.
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judgments."' But D's culpable intent was mitigated, generally, by D's
mistake (in variations where a mistake occurs), and the degree of mitigation varied widely by "how believable or reasonable the mistake
[was] and [by] whether reasonable effort was made (short of negligence) despite the mistake.""1 4
Still more complexities emerged: further mitigation was granted to
D when the other person ("0") (e.g., the victim) was found at fault,
thus, O's contributory negligence lowers D's culpability." 5 We also
found a large difference between mistake of fact and mistake of law
cases (the former were judged more sympathetically), and between
mistake of law and willfully disregarding the law (the latter were judged
much more harshly)." 6 In the willfully disregarding variations, participants were harsh with D, even when they personally believed that the
Law was a poor or archaic one; thus, no easy nullifications resulted."7 In
the mistake of fact variations, mitigating benefits occurred only when
the D's claim seemed reasonable and defensible."8 Finally, and perhaps
surprisingly, the variable of harm was not a significant factor in most of
these cases."'
This complex pattern continued at the mid-level harm cases, with a
few additional complexities." Again, harm was not the major factor in
their culpability analyses; rather, it remained intent.2 ' We also tested a
case which breaks the causal chain. It was called Bartender, where the
latter served an underage patron who then got into an auto accident
(where there was no mild or severe injury to another), and the bartender
was the defendant." When participants see the causal chain broken-by
the actions of the underage one-they mitigate.' If the bartender willfully disregards the law (i.e., knows the patron is underage but serves
anyway), the participants get much harsher. 4 If the bartender makes a
reasonable attempt to check the patron's identification but is fooled by a

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Seeid. at91.
MaIat92.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 91.
See id. at 92-93.
at 92.
See id.
See id. at 84-85.
See id. at 92.
See id. at 102.
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phony identification, they mitigate, as a reasonable attempt has been
made."2
At the highest level of harm, intent is again primary.2 6 But here, at
the upper reaches, where a defendant intends to kill, for example, his
mistakes do not mitigate his culpability, "even when his mistake produces less harm, no harm, or creates an impossible act situation. Here,
then, is the limiting condition of mitigation for mistake of fact situations. Said another way, once you premeditate, you do not benefit
through mitigation for your mistakes. ' ' "DYet we still find that the O's
culpability will interact with D's intent, lowering D's culpability., In
general, CSJ's culpability judgments are finely graded and attuned to a
complex array of interacting factors, a finding that is replicated in other
empirical work.'29
C. Where Simple Objective Rules Do Not Hold:
CSJ's ManslaughterStory
In the twentieth century, black-letter law's position on manslaughter has swung dramatically from its centuries-old roots in objectivityto subjectivity-the latter being most evident in the Model Penal Code's
extreme emotional disturbance ("EED") test." But if we begin with
Lord Coke's early formulation of manslaughter" and follow its common-law evolution over the next two centuries, we see the accretion of
objective rules, creating not only a Hydra-headed beast, but one where
the parts were eventually bumping into one another in inconsistent and
contradictory ways.'
The law's objective theory is, I submit,
fundamentally a psychological theory of human nature. [It has to be.]
This psychological theory involves a complex story of how provocations (their type and intensity) relate to emotions (the heat of passion,
125. See id.
at 101.
126. See id.
at 93.
127. Id. at 93.

128. See id. at 92-93.
129. See ROBINSON & DARLEY,supra note 23, at 94-96; Greene & Darley, supra note 105, at
432-48.
130. See Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I-Provocation,Emotional Disturbance, and the Model PenalCode, 27 B.C. L. REv. 243, 288-92 (1986).
131. 2 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRsT PART OF THE INsTITUTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
§ 287.b (Garland Publ'g, Inc. 1979) (1832) ("Homicide, as it is legally taken, is when one is slaine
with a man's will, but not with malice prepensed.").
132. See Norman J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and Hamlet Brooding: On
the Story of the Murder/ManslaughterDistinction, 74 NEB.L. REV. 742, 745 (1995).
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and the type of passions); how these provocations and emotions affect
thinking, intention, and reason; and how provocations, emotions, and
reason relate to our capacity to control the actions they seem to impel,
and if we even make 33choices, as we normally understand that term,
under such conditions.
Yet even this presentation is oversimplified, for the law's psychological
theory goes deeper still: it also involves time (whether provocations occur in objective time, and then fade and are no more; or whether they
linger, fester, and reactivate in psychological, subjective time), situational context, and the history of the actor, as these factors must necessarily be considered when we theorize about blood cooling or emotions
roiling."M This objective black-letter law theory turns out to be contradicted at many points by academic psychology's facts and theories relating to provocations, emotions, thinking, and control, and contradicted
by how CSJ decides such cases. 35 In short, we again see CSJ considering and weighing a greater set of factors, and using a complex calculus
to do so, rather than resorting to simple rules of thumb. Some provocations will mitigate, some will not, but the list is neither fixed nor veridical with the Law's designations. Some provocations produce emotions
that are sympathetically regarded, while others produce emotions that
are regarded critically.'36 Time in the psychological sense assumes far
greater importance than events occurring in objective time; thus,
brooding and rekindling cases get greater mitigation than the law would
allow.37 But when D puts himself in a dangerous situation-and should
have known this (i.e., another type of culpability)-then little mitigation
will result. 3s But if 0 is at fault, this will mitigate D's culpability. 3 '

133. Ia at744.
134. See id.

135. See id. at 745. We tested two landmark cases, one British, Directorof Public Prosecutions v. Bedder, 1 W.L.R. 1119 (England 1959), and one American, State v. Gounagais, 153 P. 9

(Wash. 1915), by creating multiple versions of each, manipulating such variables as provocation
and type of provocation, type of emotion felt, time (between provocation and act), brooding vs.
rekindling vs. frequent rekindling, and historicalbackground of the actor. See Finkel, supra note

132, at 779-81.
136. See Finkel, supra note 132, at 780, 790; Victoria Nourse, Passion'sProgress:Modem
Law Reform and the ProvocationDefense, 106 YALE L.L 1331, 1393-94 (1997); Jonathan Simon,
From a Tight Place: Crime, Punishment, and American Liberalism, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv.
853, 863-64 (1999) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, GETrING AWAY wrrIH MURDER: How PoLmcs is
DESTROYING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1998)).

137. See Finkel, supra note 132, at 781,784; Finkel, supra note 20, at 53-54.
138. See Finkel, supra note 132, at 785,789.
139. See Finkel & Groscup, When Mistakes Happen, supra note 92, at 89-90.
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CSJ's culpability analysis of manslaughter, like in other areas,

again mixes subjective and objective factors.' 4 When we look at blackletter law's swing to the subjective (in the EED) and compare it to what
CSJ does, CSJ regards the EED position as far too generous and indis-

criminate. 141 The EED's psychological theory mitigates far more than
CSJ, because it fails to consider all the factors CSJ takes account of, as
well as the interaction of those factors. 42
D. Widening Culpability,and
ProportionatelyGradingIt
There are research findings from other criminal law arenas that
support the above points. We can see the subjective vantage point being
43
taken in cases where a battered woman kills and pleads self-defense!
and where mock jurors subjectively reconstrue key prerequisites of that

defense.'" In insanity defense research, ordinary citizens invoke more
constructs for insanity, the law, different types of culpability, and gradations of culpability, than the law does.'45 And in certain outlier cases
involving euthanasia' 6 or infanticide, 47 we frequently see a construing
of the matter far differently than the law might want.
The final subtopic focuses on two long-disputed doctrines in blackletter law-felony-murder and accessorial liability. 148 The felonymurder rule substitutes or transforms the intent to commit the underlying felony into the intent to commit murder, thereby turning a non140. See Finkel, Prototypes thatare Common, supra note 3, at 467-68.
141. See FINKE, supra note 1, at31.
142. See id.
143. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel et al., The Self-Defense Defense and Community Sentiment,
15 LAW & HUM. BEtAv. 585,585,596 (1991).
144. See id. They widen serious threat, equal force, imminence, and the escape/retreat requisites in subjective ways. See id.
145. See, e.g., HERBERT FiNGAP= & ANN FINGARErTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILmES AND
CRImNAL RESPONSIBILIY 3 (1979); NORMAN J. FhNKL, INsANrrY ON TRIAL ix-xv (1988)
[hereinafter FoaE, INSANITY ON TRIAL]; Norman J. Finkel, The Insanity Defense:A Comparison
of Verdict Schemas, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 533, 533 (1991) [hereinafter Finkel, A Comparison
of Verdict Schemas]; Norman J. Finkel & Christopher Slobogin, Insanity, Justification, and Culpability Toward a Unifying Schema, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 447,450 (1995).
146. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel et al., Competency, and Other Constructs, in Right to Die
Cases, 11 BEHAV. SCiENCEs & L. 135, 135 (1993); Norman J. Finkel et al., Right to Die, Euthanasia, and Community Sentiment: Crossing the PublicdPrivateBoundary, 17 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 487, 487 (1993) [hereinafter Finkel et al., Right to Die].
147. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel et al., Commonsense Judgments of Infanticide: Murder,
Manslaughter, Madness, or Miscellaneous?, PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming Sept.
2000).
148. See Finkel, CapitalFelony-Murder,supranote 68, at 819, 820 n.9.
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premeditated killing into first degree murder.' 49 The accessorial liability
rule makes all the accessories as equally guilty as the triggerman"
Empirical tests demonstrate that CSJ rejects both rules.' To illustrate,
time and again, across numerous variations tested using hypothetical
variants and those drawn from Supreme Court cases, participants reject
the equalism proposition of accessorial liability; instead, they grade
each defendant's culpability based on that individual's intent and degree
of participation in the crime."2 Furthermore, participants see a large and
significant difference between the felony-murder triggerman and the
premeditated murder triggerman' 53 Put another way, for CSJ, significant
differences are registered rather than blurred, and proportional culpability judgments reign, rather than a one size fits all rule."5
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence on this point comes from an
experiment run with the youngest of participants, children in kindergarten.'55 We created a non-frightening version of felony-murder and accessorial liability by paring them down to their essential principles in our
scenarios."' The basic script was this: four children decide to do something that they know is wrong (e.g., steal a copy of an upcoming math
test), and then, during the commission of this crime, the ringleader
(triggerman) does something worse (sees the teacher's purse, and takes
money from it, unbeknownst to the accessories), and thus a further harm
(crime) results.' 57 The children participants, even those in kindergarten,
make their culpability and punishment decisions proportionately.'
IV.

COMMONSENSE JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT

In examining CSJ and the Law, particularly where evidence of disparities is sought, it makes good sense to go beyond culpability to punishment. Of the two, culpability assessment is the more familiar task for
jurors, whereas punishment judgments, particularly when we exclude
civil law cases (e.g., damage awards) and focus on those within criminal

149.
150.
151.
152.

See id. at 820 n.9.
See i.
See Finkel & Duff, Testing the Supreme Court'sAssertions, supra note 75, at 410-21.
See Finkel, CapitalFelony-Murder,supra note 68, at 825, 876, 887.

153. See id.
154. See id. at 889.
155. See Norman J. Finkel et al., Equal or ProportionalJusticefor Accessories? Children's
Pearlsof ProportionateWisdom, 18 J. APPLIED CHILD DEv. PSYCHOL. 229, 234 (1997).

156. See id.
157.

See id. at 234-35.

158. See id. at 236-37, 239.
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law, are seldom within the province of the jury, although the infrequently brought death penalty cases are the exceptions.
This familiar/unfamiliar difference is augmented by another factor:
culpability considerations are far more circumscribed, specified, and
defined (in both substance and procedure) than sentencing factors and
guidelines.' 9 For example, the elements of the charge (i.e., the actus
reus and mens rea) are specified, and the judge's instructions will define
those specific elements, along with burden and standard of proof, reasonable doubt, and the rule for deciding (a unanimous decision versus
something else).' Moreover, the jury's culpability bandwidth is largely
circumscribed to those moment of the act facts, such that past history
(e.g., a defendant's prior crimes), ancillary harms (e.g., victim impact
testimony), and future predictions (e.g., dangerousness) are likely to be
excluded from consideration, or sharply limited.' 6' And finally, the
judge will give the jury a verdict form, where the legal choices are laid
out (e.g., murder versus manslaughter versus not guilty), and the key
differentiations detailed in patterned instructions.' 62
This is not how it works with sentencing considerations, and the
death penalty is illustrative. The bandwidth under consideration now
widens considerably. For example, highly emotional victim impact testimony may be heard,' 6 which widens the notion of harm the defendant's actions produced. Also, background facts from the defendant's
past are likely to be heard,' 6 which would not be heard during the culpability phase. Questionable expert testimony may also be heard,'"
which may predict future violence with far more certainty than the expert's science supports.' 6" But even as aggravating and mitigating factors
come into play, clear definitions of what aggravating and mitigating
actually mean are often missing or confusing.'67 And even when the
statutorily sanctioned aggravating factors are listed, imprecision and
vagueness can lead to odd comprehension,' 6" whereas mitigating factors
159. See, e.g., Finkel & Smith, PrincipalsandAccessories, supra note 73, at 143.
160. See BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 856 (6th ed. 1990) (defining jury instruction); FINKEL,
supra note 1, at 76 (discussing actus reus and mens rea).
161. See generally FINKEL, supra note 1, at 319 (explaining how nullifying jurors tend to
weigh more factors than the law provides).
162. See id. at 77-78.
163. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); FINKEL, supra note 1, at 187-88, 189
(discussing the case law preexisting Payne and the Payne Court's holding).

164. See FINKEL, supra note 1, at 181-82.
165. See id. at 182.

166. See id.
167. See id. at 176-77 (examining a Georgia statute's 10 factor balancing test approach).
168. See id. at 177.
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need not even be specified by statute. 6 9 Moreover, the rule for weighing
and balancing these factors, under these so-called guided discretionary
schemes, actually provides little guidance.17 Unlike a judge, who makes
sentencing determinations all the time and has the actual book of sentencing guidelines at hand (and an appellate court over his or her shoulder to question downward departures), the jury is less well armed, given
little guidance, has neither familiarity nor stare decisis to draw on, and
gets no appellate correction for the next time, as there is no next time. 7'
From each of these factors, and when all are taken together, we would
predict greater variance in the sentencing task. Yet variance, as a measure, can be most revealing, for from that variance we might find that
CSJ's sentencing departures (from what black-letter law might do or
wish) to be even greater than in its culpability assessments, revealing
some nuances that the latter do not.
Finally, and methodologically, in the sentencing situation where a
qualitative death versus life decision is not made, but where quantitative
years in prison is the typical dependent measure, this may reveal disparities that the qualitative culpability measure (guilty or not guilty)
does not. To illustrate, three defendants, in three different cases, may all
be found guilty of second degree murder, and thus the culpability judgments appear the same; but if one was a heat of passion case, another a
mugging/shooting case, and the third an infanticide case, the sentences
given may be significantly different, despite verdict agreement. To the
researcher, this quantitative measure of sentencing length, particularly
when we can examine it where the qualitative culpability measure is
held constant (i.e., defendants are guilty of the same crime), may reveal
differences that the qualitative verdict measure missed."'
A. QualitativeSentencingThe Life or Death Decision
In experimental tests of accessory felony-murder, we compared accessories labeled Getaway Driver ("A"), Lookout ("B"), and Sidekick
("C"), who differed from one another in their actions at the crime scene,
their physical proximity to the death and thus their ability to intervene,
169. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978); see also Gillers, supra note 68, at
23 (positing the question of whether aggravating factors can distinguish one murder from another).
170. For a discussion of these problems, see FINKEL, supranote 1, at 177.
171. See Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 19, at 917; see also FINKEL, supra note 1, at 323-24
(observing that while stare decisis plays a significant role for the law, it carries no significance for

jurors).
172. See infra notes 200-12 and accompanying text.
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their culpable intentions, and who differed on these dimensions from the
Triggerman ("D"). 173 Our best comparative measure was the percentage
of life or death decisions that mock jurors74 rendered-for only those
defendants who were found guilty of felony-murder and were thus eligible for the death sentence-as this holds culpability constant.'75 Over
all the case variations we tested, we found that the percentage of death
sentences for the Getaway Driver (A), Lookout (B), Sidekick (C), and
Triggerman (D) were 0%, 15.4%, 12.5%, and 20.0% respectively, a
highly significant difference.'76 Moreover, when we compared the felony-murder triggerman to a case where the triggerman premeditates the
murder unbeknownst to his felony-murder accomplices, the death percentage jumps to 66.7% for this premeditating-Triggerman, another
significant differentiation." This pattern of proportional sentencing to
perceived culpability recurs over many case variations, including the
rationale taken by the Supreme Court in the Tison7 case.
We also tested in a different way, using what was called the Ninth
Justice paradigm.'79 Here, the participants play the part of a Supreme
Court Justice, having to make a "let stand" or "reverse and remand"
decision on each of the defendants (A, B, C, and D), all of whom had
been given the death sentence, and where the other justices were divided
4-4 This way of testing might pull for more let stand decisions, as
participants know that a jury has already sentenced them to death. Despite this potential pull or biasing effect, the reverse and remand percentages were 97% (A), 83% (B), 69% (C), and 53% (D, who is a felony-murder triggerman) respectively. 8 '

173.

See Finkel & Duff, Testing the Supreme Court's Assertions, supra note 75, at 409-10,

417.
174. See id. at 415, 417 n.7. All the participants were "death qualified" ("DQ") which was
defined as "those [jurors] who were willing to consider voting to impose the death penalty in some
cases, were not nullifiers, had attitudes that would not substantially impair their abilities, and
would not automatically vote for the death penalty." See Finkel & Smith, Principalsand Accesso.
ries, supranote 73, at 136 n.6.

175. See Finkel & Duff, Testing the Supreme Court'sAssertions, supra note 75, at 417.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). In Tison, the Court reviewed a death sentence given to three brothers convicted of felony-murder. See id. at 138-39. Although the brothers
had "no intent to kill," the Court determined that the requisite "intent to kill" necessary to support
a death sentence under its prior holding in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), included

"participation in a violent felony under circumstances likely to result in the loss of innocent human
life... even absent an 'intent to kill."' d at 154.

179. See Finkel & Duff, Testing the Supreme Court'sAssertions, supra note 75, at 410.
180. See id.
181.

Seeid.at418.
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Finally, we asked these Ninth Justices to give their reasons for their
decisions and we cluster analyzed them. For those who reached a reverse and remand decision, the three dominant reasons that emerged
were: felony-murder per se is disproportionate for minor accessories;
the death penalty is disproportionate for felony-murder; and the defendant's at issue lacked the intent needed for death.'
Four points emerge. First, the sentencing results show even wider
departures from accessorial liability's and felony-murder's equalism
proposition, as these sentencing departures are found after all defendants were found guilty of the same offense.'83 Second, the dispa.'ties
among these defendants were consistent-and proportional-across differing methods of testing the proposition (i.e., give a life or death sentence, or make a let stand versus reverse and remand decision, or examining reasons for the decision).8" Third, their reasons were not offbase. " And fourth, within the legal
literature, we find eminent judges
16
and justices making similar points. 1
As stated above, these findings recur, where sentencing measures
show even greater spread than culpability measures. This was also the
case in an experiment cited earlier, using kindergarten, third grade, and
fifth grade participants." Giving these kids free reign to set the punishments (e.g., grounding, no television, no visits from friends, no telephone, physical
punishment) for the four defendants, they did so pro88
portionately.
When we examine data on the juvenile death penalty, comparing
different cases, comparing juveniles and adults of different ages, and
comparing types of murderers, where the participants either render a
sentence or make the let stand versus reverse and remand decision (and

182.
183.
184.
185.
ishment

See id. at 419-20.
See id. at 417.
See id. at 427.
These general findings of fine-grained discriminations, gradations of liability and punjudgments, and rational reasons for them, were also found by Greene & Darley, supra

note 105, at 445-50.
186. To cite but two examples, the nineteenth century Victorian judge, Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen, held that the felony-murder doctrine had credence gained only from repetition, and he
then went on to call the doctrine "astonishing" and "monstrous," with "little or no authority," see 3
SIR JAMES FrAIm8ES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRuIINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 38, 57, 65, 75
(William S. Hein & Co. ed.) (1883), while Justice Brennan, in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 159
(1987), called it "a living fossil" Id.

187. See Finkel, supra note 155, at 239 tbl.4.
188. See IhLat 236, 239. We found, as an arguable analogy to "death," that "no Nintendo"
seemed closest to the death sentence and that this most severe penalty was typically restricted to
the ringleader. See id. at 236.
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give their reasons), discriminations and proportionality again recur.'89
We first compared three cases that the Supreme Court has decided: the
cases of a fifteen-year-old (Thompson v. Oklahoma),'9' sixteen-year-old
(Wilkins v. Missouri),'9' and seventeen-year-old (Stanford v. Kentucky).' The Court's comparisons were focused exclusively on the age
factor, 93 but we found a case factor (i.e., differences in perceived heinousness among the cases), that interacted with age, and this unexamined factor by the Court may have confounded its read of their objective
indicia.'" Using our experimentally controlled method, where we could
test for the case effect and hold the case effect constant across the ages
of defendants." The cases produced significantly different death rate
percentages (Stanford = 22%, Thompson = 43%, and Wilkins = 57%)96
The age effect was also significant, but not in the way the Court called it
in Stanford.' And when we tested a principal versus accessory versus
felony-murder accessory, the latter's death rate was significantly lower
than the other two, and this type of murderer variable also interacted
with age. 9 And once again, the participants' reasons for their decisions,
be it let stand or reverse and remand, were on point and consistent with
those offered by justices. 19
B. QuantitativeSentencing in
Recidivist Cases
Politicians have been "rushing to enact harsher crime bills wherein
sentences grow steeper, higher minimum sentences are made mandatory, and the death sentence is applied in more and more cases.""2 ' This
"steeper-firmer-deadlier ' ' " approach, as in "third strike" legislation, is
premised on the following sort of contention: the habitual offender, this
recidivist, is clearly not learning his or her lesson, for despite all the
189. See Finkel et al., Juvenile Death Penalty,supra note 75, at 5.
190. 487 U.S. 815, 818-19 (1988).
191. This case was condensed with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 366 (1989).
192. See id. at 365.
193. See Finkel et al., Juvenile Death Penalty,supra note 75, at 12.
194. See id.
195. In our first experiment, we tested the juvenile ages of 15, 16, and 17, and the adult ages
of 18 and 25; in the second experiment, we added ages 13 and 14 to the above. See id. at 12-14.
196. See id. at 13.
197. Compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 396 (1989), with Finkel et al., Juvenile
Death Penalty, supra note 75, at 13.
198. See Finkel et al., Juvenile Death Penalty,supra note 75, at 15.
199. See id. at 18-19.
200. Finkel et al., Recidivism, Proportionalism,supra note 75, at 474.
201. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol28/iss3/4

28

Finkel: Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment
2000]

COMMONSENSE JUSTICE

previous proportional punishments that have been administered, the
criminal behavior continues; this seemingly unrepentant criminality
calls for escalating, disproportionate, even exponentially-increasing
punishment, now.'r
In Rummel v. Estelle2n and Solem v. Helm,2 ' the Supreme Court, in
two five-to-four decisions that went in opposite directions, spoke to
these exponential-like punishments, as to whether they were cruel and
unusual. These sharply divided Court decisions are primafacie indications of doubt. The empirical question, set in the terms of experimental
methods, was what would CSJ do when it came to sentencing?
We created two roughly parallel cases to Solem and Rummel, a noaccount check case and a shop lifting case.25 In condition one, these
were their first crimes, with no priors, and participants were asked to set
a sentence, and they were given no sentencing guideline (lN-1 crime,
no anchor).06 In the next variations, the six priors were added, making
this their seventh crime.' Condition two (7N-7 crimes, no anchor)
tests the recidivist effect, which when compared to condition one and
condition three (7A-7 crimes, anchor) tests whether a guideline exerts
an effect, and how people use the anchor25 For example, if an anchor of
five years is given for the no-accounting checking case, will participants
just give five years as the sentence, even though this is the seventh offense? Said another way, will they discount the priors entirely? Or will
they count the priors? And if they count the priors, do they perform
some additive, multiplicative, or exponential math, escalating the punishments dramatically?
202. See id at 478.
203. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Rummel's third crime involved obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, while his first two offenses involved fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth
of goods and services, and passing a forged check for $28.36. See id. at 265-66. He was convicted
under Texas' recidivist statute, and was sentenced to life imprisonment, though Rummel had the
prospect of parole. See id. at 266-67. The Supreme Court upheld the sentence. See id. at 285.
204. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Jerry Buckley Helm wrote a check for $100.00 on a nonexistent
account. See id. at 281. He had six prior nonviolent felony convictions, three for third-degree burglary, one for obtaining money under false pretenses, one for grand larceny, and one for thirdoffense driving while intoxicated. See 1d. at 279-80. Tried under South Dakota's recidivist statute,
he was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See id. at
281-82. The Supreme Court found that this sentence was violative of the Eighth Amendment's bar
on disproportionate punishment. See id. at 303.
205. Finkel et al., Recidivism, Proportionalism,supra note 75, at 477-78.
206. See id. A guideline, such as the typical sentence range for the crime, might serve to anchor or influence their sentences. We wanted some case variations to test "no anchor" vs.

"anchor." See id. at 478.
207. See id.
208. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 28:669

Staying with the Solem case, the results for conditions 1N,7N, and
7A were 10.4 months, 86 months, and 143 months, respectively-all of
which are significantly distant from life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.' The differences were even greater in our case that
paralleled Rummel,2 even though we added four more priors to that
case: the sentences under the 1N,7N, and 7A conditions were approximately 75% lower.2 1 Clearly, CSJ uses the priors in its calculations and
it uses the anchor information when it is given, but nothing resembling
the new exponential math results. 212 Thus, where the Supreme Court was
clearly divided in these cases, CSJ was not.
V. A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Sometimes disparities occur right from the beginning, even before
culpability and punishment assessments are undertaken. This was most
evident in some of our right to die and euthanasia cases, where a minority of participants viewed these cases as ."'no[n] legal matter[s] at all. 21 3
In the way they framed the case, it fell into a privacy zone, into which
the Law should not enter; from such a framing, there was a fundamental
disagreement over its status as a legal case right from the outset. 24 This
phenomenon also occurred in certain insanity case variations tested,
where a minority of participants viewed the matter outside the parameters of the law; they saw it as a tragic accident, not as a crime requiring
adjudication." 5 If jurors have a question (e.g., "Why is this case being
brought?"), which they have already transformed into a conclusion
('This case ought not to be brought!"), then the odds of an apparent
wrongful verdict or an outright nullification rise appreciably.
But now let us assume that the Law and CSJ both frame the case as
a matter for the Law and one in which a legal assessment is necessary.
In doing an assessment, the Law and CSJ generally 2 look to certain

209. See iLat 480.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id at481.
213. Finkel et al., Right to Die, supranote 146, at 502 (emphasis omitted).
214. See id.
215. See Finkel, A Comparison of Verdict Schemas, supra note 145, at 545. This phenomenon
occurred when a female defendant, during an epileptic seizure, shot and killed the victim with a
pistol. See id. at 541-42.
216. On the Law's side, there are exceptions to this rule. For "strict liability" offenses, it is
the act, and not the intent, that matters, yet as Hart notes, these offenses are "generally viewed
with great odium." H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 20 (1968). This sort of exception has also been found by many legal analysts of the fel-
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factors, which can be dichotomized as either subjective or objective."7
In culpability determinations, the Law endorses a rule-that the subjective factor (mens rea) and the objective factor (actus reus) must conjoin-and the research findings reviewed in Part Ill reveal that CSJ
generally endorses that rule. In punishment determinations, the Law endorses another rule-that more factors may and ought to be taken into
consideration-and again, as the research findings reviewed in Part IV
show, CSJ generally endorses that rule as well. Thus, these broadlyagreed-to-rules provide common coordinates for both the Law and CSJ,
as each surveys culpability and punishing ground. But even though both
begin with common coordinates, the ground we surveyed in Parts I
and IV revealed that their respective analyses end in frequent disparities, where "different rules" reign for CSJ,218a process and outcome that
poses a significant threat to Law's Empire.
A. Rules of Law, "Ruleless Law," or Rhyme and
Reason Beneath the Oxymoron?
The threat, of course, is to the rule of law, which the Law clearly
wants to govern, rather than to have an oxymoron, ruleless law, reign.
Upping the danger is the systemic fact that this threat can manifest at
any moment, in any case-because the Law has put CSJ within its
province-right in the jury box, with the power to decide; and the danger reaches red zone levels when CSJ and the Law view culpability and
punishment matters quite disparately. 9 If the negatives of sedition, nullification, or anarchy result with some frequency, or worse, at the level
some critics of jurors maintain, then this is diagnostic evidence that the
Law's efforts to channel CSJ to comport with the rules of law are failing.

ony-murder rule and doctrine because the subjective intent to commit the murder is missing;
whether intent just does not matter, as in strict liability, or whether transferred intent or constructive malice is the legal legerdemain used to pull the intent rabbit out of the empty hat, has been
debated. See, e.g., Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-MurderRule: A Doctrine at
ConstitutionalCrossroads,70 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 453-57 (1985). But these exceptions, along
with the controversies within the Law about them, seem to prove the rule that both Law and CSJ
require both the subjective and the objective.

217. See Finkel & Groscup, CrimePrototypes, supranote 23, at 211.
218. See RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPnE 43 (1986).
219. See generally Finkel & Groscup, Crime Prototypes,supra note 23, at 211 (discussing the
experimental results of jury verdicts which are based on subjective notions of fair and just depar-

tures from the law).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:669

But in fairness to another rule of law-that both sides get a hearing--we must ask whether these are solely negatives, or even negatives at all. If we assume that disparity is a symptom, then questions of
etiology and treatment may help to focus the analysis: Is there pathology beneath the disparity, or is there some underlying rationality and
sense? And if it is disorder of one sort or another, what is the treatment,
and who is the patient?
Although subjectivity is the starting point of CSJ's culpability
analysis, there is nothing pathogenic about this. Such a starting point recurs in research involving story models-about how jurors construe
facts and create a story-and these findings tell us that jurors typically
begin with the subjective motives and intentions of the actor, that propel
the action." l This starting point is also the one lay readers adopt when
tackling a novel or detective fiction, trying to find the motivational
thread that weaves plot and story. And if we examine how prosecuting
and defense attorneys tell their stories in opening and closing statements, we would probably find the subjective thread woven quite
prominently throughout those stories as well.
Were we to find that subjectivity is also CSJ's ending point, with
no changes in between, that would be problematic, for that would leave
objective reality out of the analysis entirely. But to the contrary, the
cases reviewed in Parts III and IV show that no such psychotic-like
process occurs, because objective reality is brought into these analyses
at various points, for various purposes. So by conjoining objectivity and
subjectivity in some balancing fashion, CSJ is doing what the Law expressly wants.
By contrast, when we turn the diagnostic eye to the Law's side of
the ledger, we see bipolar swings. The following four examples illustrate this. First, the Law's take on impossible act cases represents an
objective extreme, for if the act could not be a criminal act, then there is
no guilt despite the actor's culpable subjective intent.' Second, the Law
seems to require necessary and sufficient causality for the categorical
judgment of murder, whereas necessary but not sufficient would land
the defendant in the lower category of attempted murder. By contrast,
220. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also 16B AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 960
(1998) (interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Constitution as affording both sides the right to
a hearing).
221. See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALrrY IN

THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT INAMERCAN CULTURE 64-65 (1981).
222. See Fimkel & Groscup, When Mistakes Happen, supra note 92, at 70 ("If, as the legal
maxim goes, the actus reus and the mens rea must conjoin for guilt, then there is no guilt [in an
impossible act case].").
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CSJ draws a finer distinction, as ordinarily sufficient but not necessary
would land the defendant in a category betwixt murder and attempted
murder. Third, manslaughter's ontogeny begins with objective rules and
ends with the Model Penal Code's "extreme ...emotional disturbance"' test, which swings to the subjective extreme.4 In contrast,
CSJ's views on manslaughter reveal a complex mix of objective and
subjective factors, leading to many discriminations between these two
extremes.' And fourth, in felony-murder and accessory felony-murder
cases, the Law blurs or erases culpability distinctions among accessories, between accessories and the triggerman, and between the felonymurder triggerman and the premeditated-murder triggerman, ending up
with equalism. Although the Law appears blind to differences, CSJ is
not, for it sees this odd equal treatment as neither individualized justice
nor proportional justice.227
B. Cooking Up Culpability
Using a cooking analogy, we can break the culpability assessment
into a series of steps and questions. What ingredients go into the mix?
How are they weighed and measured? And how are they flavored,
combined, and cooked?
In answer to the first question, CSJ typically reaches for more ingredients than the Law, a finding that recurs over wide legal areas.2 To
the second question, even when both the Law and CSJ agree about the
ingredients, CSJ's approach to weights and measures is decidedly unformulaic: instead of using simple and invariant rules, CSJ's method is
richly interactive and highly contextual. 9 And to the third question,
even if the Law and CSJ agree about the ingredients, and agree about
their respective weights, jurors are likely to flavor, combine, and cook
them in more subjective and psychological ways, throwing in past experiences, intuitions, sentiments, biases, heuristics, construals, and prototypes, as they wok and roll."0

223. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
224. See Singer, supra note 130, at 291-92 ("The Code ...jettisoned all of the object language and tests of the past 150 years ....).
225. See FINKEL, supra note 1, at 317-18.
226. See id. at 170.
227. See Finkel, supranote 20, at 16.
228. See FINKEL, supranote 1, at2, 5-6, 170-71.

229. See id.
230. See id.at 63-78 (discussing the prior knowledge, experiences, and notions that jurors
bring with them to court).
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Admittedly, some of these flavorings, such as blatant biases and
base sentiments, are extralegal, and ought to be struck from the mix." 1
Yet the impermissible slips through, at times. It may slip through on occasion because the voir dire filter fails; more likely, it slips through because jury instructions are written in ways that allow for reconstrual,
revision, multiplication, and division. Still, the ingredients, weights, and
flavorings reviewed in Part m were, in the main, apt, though absent
from the Law's recipe.
That CSJ adds a new culpability ingredient to insanity (culpability
for bringing about ones' mental deterioration) and finds a deeper culpability construct (capacity to make responsible choices) are not pathogenic signs; nor is it disordered to believe that a small provocation can
ignite an old but undead larger provocation from the past, as in rekindler
situations in manslaughter; nor is it breaking with reality to see serious
threat, the escape option, and imminence in self-defense law from a
subjective vantage point, or through the eyes of a subjective reasonable
woman standard. These are, in fact, directions the Law has belatedly
moved toward.~2 While these belated moves may be instantiations of
Roscoe Pound's prediction that when there is a "divergence between the
standard of the common law and the standard of the public, it goes
without saying that the latter will prevail in the end," 3 there is something more instructive here than capitulating to what appears inevitable.
Rather, the Law can draw insights from CSJ's thinking, opening up its
ways of thinking, to produce sounder and better justice.
C. Misfits, Creative Reconstructions,and
OutrightNullifications
In developing the cooking analogy, I have omitted the presentation,
the serving of the dish, which translates into how the culpability judgment is rendered. Here, jurors are restrained by and restricted to the
verdict options the Law provides. But as we have seen in Part In and as
I have argued above, CSJ makes more discriminations than black-letter
law's options typically provide. Such a systemic state of affairs is going

231. See id. at 72.
232. See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 559 (Wash. 1977) (reviewing an erroneous
jury charge that instructed the jury on an objective standard of reasonableness for assessing the
culpability of a female defendant claiming self-defense); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
233. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607, 615
(1907).
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to produce misfits, and the appearance, at times, of wrongful verdicts, 2
where the blame is laid, typically, at CSJ's doorstep. But shoehorning
one's first choice-into one of the limited and ill-fitting remainders-is
a valid problem, and if they attempt to solve it within the options given,
misfits will be inevitable.
Still, from the jurors' vantage point, they are not likely to understand why their first choice verdict option is not on the verdict form.
Perhaps it is there, though not plainly evident nor in plain language.
With a bit of creative reconstruing, they may make it fit, although this is
not what the Law had in mind. For example, if a battered woman kills
her spouse in a nonconfrontational situation, and the jury sees selfdefense but the judge does not, and the latter does not give them that
option, then the jury may reconstrue insanity (if not guilty by reason of
insanity is an available option) to provide fit, or they may shoehorn into
manslaughter, though serious threat, imminence, and escape preconditions do not seem to be met, or they might nullify with a straight not

guilty.
D. Parsingthe 'Imparsible'?
We saw one version of this problem in insanity jurisprudence,
when jurors see two types of culpability-(at the moment of the act) for
the act, and (prior to the act) for bringing about the disorder-but have
to conflate the two because they have only one type (the former) to assess. Thus, their relevant and determinative discriminations come to
naught. But instead of dropping their distinctions in favor of the Law's
more limited take, the research findings show that they will nestle their
distinctions into the available categories, dilating the category and confounding the judgments." s The opposite problem, amounting to the
234. A striking example of this occurred during the post-Hinckley hearings, in the Senate
Subcommittee on Criminal Law hearings, in the following colloquy that took place between
Senator Heflin and the foreperson of the Hincldey jury, Ms. Copelin, who pointed to the verdict
form, and the lack of a third-choice option, which the jury was looking for.
Senator Heflin: In other words, if you had had another alternative choice-

Ms. Copelin: Correct.
Senator Heflin [continuing]. Then it couldMs. Copelin.... If I had had another choice, in fact if we all had had another choice, it
would have been different now. It would not have been this way.
Everyone knew beyond a shadow of a doubt that he was guilty for what he did. But
we had that mental problem to deal with. We just could not shut that out.
Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 1995, S. 2572, S. 2658,
and S. 2669 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong. 164 (1982) (statements of Senator Heflin and Ms. Copelin).
235. See Fumm, supra note 1, at 288-90.
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same problem, results when the Law parses culpability and punishment,
but where the jurors tend to fuse the two, or when leakage between the

two occurs, as in the liability judgment and damages award judgment in
certain civil law cases. 6
E. Extracting CSJ's Instructive Lessons
In summing up, CSJ's views on justice and fairness, and on culpability and punishment, are far from simplistic-complex is the more
apt designation. But is complexity worthy of attention, and to what
should the Law attend? In short, what is the instructive message of this?

First, we see changes in what CSJ focuses on and how it frames the
matter, with a more subjective, psychological, and wider perspective
taken to both. Instead of the Law's narrower focus on a particular defendant, at the moment of the act, CSJ sees the defendant in relationship

to other actors who may provoke, make mistakes, or contribute to the
overall culpability picture. In this wider frame, the causal nexus is more

complicated, with interaction effects replacing a simple causality view.
In addition, by adopting a more subjective, psychological perspective,
the interior drama moves to the surface, not replacing the objective reality with some fiction, but giving the facts meaning. Moreover, CSJ
sees the defendant and the alleged action as existing in time, in a con-

text, with a history of prior actions and decisions, so a widening in time,
person, and psychology results; regarding the psychology, it is both
deeper at the intrapersonal, clinical level, and far richer at the social and

community psychology levels. From this way of seeing, actions do not
spring just from the immediate precipitator, but may have germinal
236. See, e.g., C. Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and Defendant Reprehensibility: Implications
for Compensatory and Punitive DamageAwards, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 189, 189 (1996); Neal
Feigenson et al., Effect of Blameworthinessand Outcome Severity on Attributionsof Responsibility
and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAWv & HUM. BEiIAV. 597, 608
(1997); Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Jurorand JuryJudgments in Civil Cases:Deciding Liability
for Punitive Damages, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 307 (1998). when plaintiff and defendant
negligence needs to be assessed, there is often a "double discounting" problem. See, e.g., Douglas
J. Zickafoose & Brian H. Bornstein, Double Discounting: The Effects of ComparativeNegligence
on Mock JurorDecision Making, 23 LAW & Hum. BEHAv. 577, 591 (1999). Moreover, hindsight
biases have been shown to effect judgments of liability and punitive damages as well. See, e.g.,
Reid Hastie et al., JurorJudgments in Civil Cases: HindsightEffects on Judgments of Liabilityfor
Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 597, 598-99 (1999). It has further been shown that
the concepts of compensatory and punitive damages are often confused and leak into each other.
See, e.g., Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in JurorAssessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 314-16 (1999);
Roselle L. Wissler et al., Explaining "Painand Suffering" Awards: The Role of Injury Characteristics and FaultAttributions, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181, 184 (1997).
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roots extending further back in time and deeper into the psyche, quite
beyond the moment of the act or a momentary intention. Thus, from all
of these changes, CSJ's picture is likely to be quite different from the
Law's, at times; in fact, in certain cases, their perspective, focus, and
framing may lead them to a contrary construction, where they do not see
this case as a legal matter at all.
If CSJ widens the focus and frame, it also narrows and makes finegrained discriminations. This is most evident regarding culpability,
where the Law seems to wield a too blunt cleaver to separate the guilty
from the not, while CSJ uses the scalpel to produce finer cuts; and even
where the Law does carve a mitigating middle category, CSJ's dissections grade the matter into thinner, discriminable slices, each worthy of
a separate diagnosis and treatment. That CSJ registers gradations to culpability," 7 in comparison to the Law's more dichotomous cuts, is the
prevailing finding across a wide swath of legal ground. A less frequent
finding (though significant for outcome, process, and theory) is that CSJ
registers different types of culpability, whereas the Law focuses more
on some unitary, generic culpability judgment, which must conflate
what CSJ parses.3' Overall, then, CSJ's distinctions regarding both type
and degree of culpability better track the nuances of mens rea than the
Law's approach.
Regarding CSJ's distinctions, we can ask: What sort of justice does
this lead to, and is this a direction the Law ought to consider? From our
review, the outcome is clearly not anarchy, the Law's worst nightmare.
Rather, it is, above all else, proportionaljustice, where actions and intentions are graded and tuned to nuances worth making. It deals with the
particulars of the case more psychologically, in a more sophisticated
and fair manner, for it willingly enters the subjectivity of the defendant
in order to try to fathom the thinking and motives that propel the acts.
This psychology is neither naive, gullible, nor pop, for it anchors itself
in objective reality, to what is reasonable. At the case level, individualized justice seems to rule, but across cases, at the higher level, the proportionality principle reigns. When put this way, black versus white, the
Law versus CSJ disparities, so evident and particularized at the outset,
now seem to fade to gray. If this is so, and the critical fears and night-

237. Many commentators within the law have made similar suggestions over the centuries.
While some of the suggestions apply to a specific area, such as insanity, manslaughter, or felonymurder, others apply the suggestion in a much broader way. See, e.g., G. E. Dix, Psychological
Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal Liability: Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility,and the Like, 62 J. CRtm. L. CR MINOLOGY & POLXCE Sc. 313 (1971).

238. See FnzE, supra note 1,at 326.
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marish visions evaporate as gossamer, then CSJ's instructive messages
are more likely to be heard.
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